DC Circuit Rules Hegseth Transgender Military Ban Unconstitutional

The D.C. Circuit issued a split decision finding that War Secretary Pete Hegseth overstepped when he ordered a ban on transgender-identifying service members, and two judges said a preliminary injunction could stay in place while the case winds through the courts.

The three-judge panel reached different conclusions about how to balance deference to military decision makers against constitutional protections, and the ruling exposes a sharp divide on whether the policy was motivated by legitimate readiness concerns or by bias. Two judges concluded the order likely violated the Equal Protection Clause, and one judge wrote strongly about evidence suggesting improper motive. The court’s split means the policy’s practical effects will remain contested as litigation continues.

Judge Robert Wilkins wrote that “The government’s stated reason for issuing the Hegseth Policy as based solely upon gender dysphoria was pretextual, and that instead, the Hegseth Policy was premised, at least in part, on a non-legitimate state interest to harm the politically unpopular group of transgender persons.” Those are hard words from a federal judge, and they shape how the injunction question was decided. The majority found enough at this stage to justify pausing the policy for the plaintiffs who brought suit.

‘We have direct evidence in this case that animus motivated the classifications in the Hegseth Policy.’ That line from the ruling is central to the court’s reasoning and it will be replayed in every filing and hearing that follows. The phrase lands heavily against the stated government rationale, and it is the factual hinge for the Equal Protection analysis the judges applied.

At the same time, two judges agreed in a separate respect that the government should be allowed to keep transgender-identifying plaintiffs out of the military while the litigation proceeds. That procedural carve out creates a messy middle ground: the underlying legal question is likely headed for more review, but the immediate operational impact on recruits and applicants can persist. Practically, that means some people will be barred for now even as the court sorts the law.

The administration defended the policy by pointing back to an executive statement about military standards, quoting that the services must maintain “high standards for troop readiness, lethality, cohesion, honesty, humility, uniformity, and integrity” and saying those standards were not compatible with the “medical, surgical, and mental health constraints on individuals with gender dysphoria.” That language frames the policy as driven by readiness concerns rather than by animus. Supporters of the policy say commanders need simple, uniform rules to make personnel and readiness choices.

In February 2025 the Defense Department issued new restrictions implementing the decision, and a defense official reported that about 4,200 troops had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria by December 2024. Those figures were part of the government’s evidence for its policy rationale. Opponents counter that large numbers alone do not prove incapacity or that a blanket bar is necessary for readiness.

Wilkins also highlighted the plaintiffs’ service records, noting they had amassed more than 80 commendations and a combined 130 years of service. That record undercut any suggestion that the challengers were unfit or unserious applicants, and it fed the court’s skepticism about the policy’s broad exclusions. Wilkins warned against ignoring visible facts, invoking the old line ‘Who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?’ to underline that the evidence in the case was plain.

Judge Justin Walker, Judge Wilkins, and Judge Judith Rogers bring varied backgrounds to the panel, with nominations spanning recent administrations, and their differences reflect broader national debates. The split decision hands more work to lower courts and possibly to the Supreme Court down the road, because it raises fundamental questions about how much leeway political branches get when they tie personnel rules to medical conditions. For now, the injunction posture and the split ruling mean policy, law, and personnel practice remain unsettled.

As litigation continues, the stakes are concrete for service members, applicants, and commanders trying to balance unit readiness against individual claims of equal treatment. The courts will have to decide whether the Hegseth Policy was a legitimate readiness measure or an unconstitutional singling out of a politically unpopular group, and the next steps will determine who can serve and under what rules.